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MihirA. Desai, C. FritzFoley,and James R. Hines Jr.*
Thispaper examines the determinantsofprofit repatriationpolicies for US multinationalfirms.
Dividend repatriationsare surprisinglypersistent and resemble dividendpayments to external
shareholders.Taxconsiderationsinfluencedividendrepatriations,butnotdecisively,as differentiallytaxedentitiesfeaturesimilarpolicies andsomefirms incuravoidabletaxpenalties.Parentcompanies
requiringcash tofund domestic investments,or to pay dividendsto commonshareholders,draw on
the resourcesof theirforeign affiliates throughrepatriations.Incompletelycontrolledaffiliatesare
more likely than others to make regular dividendpayments and to trigger avoidable tax costs
throughrepatriations.The results indicate that traditionalcorporatefinance concerns - taxation,
costly externalfinance, and agency problems- are also critical to the internalcapital marketsof
multinationalfirms.

The choice of whetherto repatriateearningsfroma foreign subsidiaryis one of the most important
decisions in multinationalfinancial management. This paper identifies the factors that shape
repatriationpolicy, therebyilluminatingthe functioningofthe internalcapitalmarketsofmultinational
firms.
Dividendrepatriationsrepresentsizable financialflows. In 1999, a year in which US corporations
listed in Compustathad after-taxearnings of $516 billion and paid $198 billion in dividends to
common shareholders(Grullonand Michaely,2002), the foreign affiliatesof US multinationalfirms
had after-taxearningsof $182 billion and repatriated$97 billion to the United States as dividends.
Dividend repatriationsare so large thatpartof the motivationfor the partialrepatriationtax holiday
in 2005 was that the resultinginflow of funds from abroadmight be large enough to have positive
macroeconomicconsequencesfor the US economy.
Surprisingly,relatively little is understood about the characteristicsand determinantsof the
policies governing these payments.This paperanalyzesthe repatriationbehaviorof virtuallyall US
multinationalparentfirmsand theirsubsidiariesfrom 1982 to 2002. The paperidentifiesthreefactors
that shape dividend policy within the multinationalfirm: 1) the taxation of dividend income, 2)
domesticfinancingandinvestmentneeds, and 3) agency problemsinside firms.

The statistical analysis offirm-level data on US multinationalcompanies was conducted at the InternationalInvestment
Division, BureauofEconomicAnalysis, USDepartmentof Commerceunderarrangementsthatmaintainlegal confidentiality
requirements.The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect official positions of the US Departmentof
Commerce.Theauthorsthankvariousseminarparticipants,two anonymousrefereesandBill Christie(the editor)for helpful
commentson an earlier draftand the Division of Researchat HarvardBusiness Schoolfor financial support.
*MihirA. Desai is the RockCenterAssociate Professor at the HarvardBusiness School and Faculty ResearchFellow at the
National Bureauof EconomicResearch. C. Fritz Foley is an AssistantProfessor ofFinance at the HarvardBusiness School
and Faculty Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research.James R. Hines Jr is RichardA. Musgrave
CollegiateProfessor of Economicsat the Universityof MichiganandResearchAssociate at theNational BureauofEconomic
Research.
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The flows of capital analyzed in this paper consist of paymentsto multinationalparentfirms
declaredout of the income of foreign subsidiaries.These flows do not include the repatriationof
investedequity.As describedbelow, tax considerationsalone would suggest that dividendpolicies
inside the firm would be irregularand lumpy. But in contrastto these predictions, dividend
repatriationsare quiteregularand can be characterizedby a processof partialadjustmentthatwas
first describedby Lintner(1956). Multinationalfirms behave as thoughthey select targetpayouts
for theirforeignaffiliates,graduallyadjustingpayoutsover time in responseto changesin earnings.
Currentdividendsby affiliatesrise by roughly$0.40 with every additionaldollarof their after-tax
profits.Thispatternof persistentpayoutsdoes not appearto be an artifactof otherregularinvestment
or financingdecisions at the affiliatelevel.
Comparingthe behaviorof foreign affiliateswhose dividendrepatriationsare subjectto high
rates of tax with the behaviorof affiliateswhose dividendsare not subjectto tax illuminatesthe
relevance of tax factors.Desai, Foley, and Hines (2001) show thatfirms pursue dividendpayout
policies designed in part to reduce tax obligations. However, furtheranalysis shows that tax
minimizationcannot explain a significantportionof the dividendpolicies observed inside firms.
Sharply distinctive tax treatmentsacross organizationalforms are associatedwith only modest
differencesin dividendpolicies. Some firms even appearto engage in a variety of tax-penalized
behaviorthatinvolves the simultaneousrepatriationof a dividendandinvestmentof new equityin
the same subsidiary.
Costly externalfinance may lead parentcompaniesto seek cash dividends from their foreign
affiliatesto satisfy domestic financingand investmentneeds. For example, corporationsthat pay
dividends to common shareholderscould fund these payments by triggering repatriations.
Comparingthe dividend behavior of affiliates of publicly and privatelyheld parentfirms and
introducingcontrols for parentaldividend payouts indicates that a portionof externaldividend
paymentsarefundedwith repatriationsfromforeignaffiliates.Surprisingly,only a small difference
exists between the dividendrepatriationpolicies of firmsfacing publiccapitalmarketpressuresto
pay dividendsto common shareholdersandthose thatdo not face such pressures.
Financially constrained parents with profitable domestic investment opportunities might
finance capital expendituresby drawingon the accumulatedearningsof foreign affiliates.This
possibility is tested by measuringthe extent to which the dividendpolicies of heavily leveraged
firms in industries with high values of Tobin's q differ from the dividend policies of other
firms. The evidence indicates that firms with significant domestic cash needs arising from
a combination of attractivedomestic investment opportunitiesand high degrees of leverage
repatriatecash from foreign affiliatesto meet these needs.
Internalagency problems, or the inability to fully monitor foreign managers,can also bring
aboutdistinctiverepatriationpolicies. Regulardividendpaymentsrestrictthe financialdiscretion
of foreign managers,therebyreducingassociatedagency problems.Conflictsof interestcan arise
when ownershipis divided, since local ownersmay influencemanagersto undertaketransactions
at other than marketprices. The empiricalresults discussed in this paperindicatethat explicitly
tax-penalizedbehavioris most commonwhen affiliatesarepartiallyowned. This findingsuggests
thatat least some of the regularityin dividendrepatriationsmaybe drivenby controlconsiderations
inside the firm.
Takenas a whole, the resultsdemonstratethattraditionalcorporatefinanceconcerns- taxation,
costly external finance, and agency problems - which are typically emphasized with respect
to arms-lengthfinancing decisions, also influence the internalcapital marketsof multinational
firms.
The paperis organizedas follows. SectionI of the papersummarizestax andnon-taxmotivations
for repatriationpolicies. Section II describes the data and provides some descriptive statistics.
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SectionIIIpresentsanalysisof the repatriationpolicies of foreignaffiliatesof Americanfirms,and
SectionIV concludes.

I. Motivationsfor RepatriationPolicies
Many previous studies of dividend repatriationsanalyze the effects of taxes. Dividend
repatriationsfrom foreign affiliates to American parent companies are voluntarydistributions
with tax consequencesthat are functions of their magnitudeand timing. Americancorporations
owe taxes to the United States on their foreign incomes but are entitledto defer US tax liabilities
on the unrepatriatedportions of the profits of incorporatedforeign affiliates. The United States
also permitsfirmsto claim creditsagainstUS taxes for any foreign income taxes paid on income
remittedas dividends.Dividend repatriationsfrom foreign subsidiariesto theirAmericanparents
thus generateUS tax liabilities thatare functionsof differencesbetween foreigntax ratesand the
US corporatetax rate.
Generally speaking, firms owe US taxes based on the difference between the applicable
foreign tax rate andthe US rate. If the US tax rate exceeds the foreign tax rate,then the effective
repatriationtax equals the difference between the two. But if the foreign tax rate exceeds the
US tax rate, then dividends do not trigger additionalUS tax liability and taxpayerscan apply
any difference against US tax liabilities on other foreign income. A notable exception to this
treatmentis that the dividend flows from unincorporatedforeign branch affiliates and incorporated foreign affiliatesthat are indirectlyowned throughcertain other countriesdo not have
US tax consequences.
US taxes are due on foreign branchincome as earned,regardlessof whetherthe branchremits
dividendsto the parentcompany.If an affiliateis indirectlyowned by a parentthatuses a holding
company located in a countrythatdoes not tax dividendrepatriations,then the firm can generally
relocate affiliate profits without incurringUS tax costs. This distinction is importantto the
analysis of taxation and repatriationpolicies because it is possible to isolate the relative importance of tax factors by comparingthe policies of incorporatedand unincorporatedforeign
subsidiaries.
The desire to avoid US tax liabilities is likely to influence dividend repatriationsin relatively
straightforwardways. Given that US tax liabilities are triggered by repatriation,these tax
liabilitiescan be deferredby reinvestingearningsabroadratherthanremittingdividendsto parent
companies.The incentiveto defer repatriationis much strongerfor affiliatesin low-tax countries
whose dividends trigger significant US tax obligations than they are for affiliates in high-tax
countries, particularlysince taxpayers receive net credits for repatriationsfrom affiliates in
countrieswith tax ratesthat exceed the US rate.'As a consequence of these incentives, dividend

'Hartman(1985) appliesthe "tax capitalization"or "new view" logic to the multinationalfirmto suggest thatrepatriation
taxes need not affect multinationaldividend policy if currentrepatriationtax conditions are not expected to change.
In practice, there is ample evidence (see Altshuler, Newlon and Randolph (1995)) that conditions do change over
time, thereby making it attractiveto repatriatedividends opportunistically.Since excess foreign tax credits cannot be
carriedforwardand back in time without loss of presentvalue, even firms in unchangingtax situationsface incentives
to combine dividend repatriationsfrom affiliates in high-tax and low-tax locations. Such strategiesare costly and not
always available, as a result of which repatriationtaxes discourage dividend repatriationsfrom affiliates, particularly
those in low-tax countries.Desai and Hines (2004) find that US firms incurred$20 billion of direct US tax liabilities on
their foreign incomes in 1999, a figure that rises considerablywhen taking indirectcosts into account, suggesting that
taxpayersare unableto find cost-effective methods of avoiding all of their US tax liabilities on foreign income.
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policies that maximize value are thoughtto be irregularand lumpy to facilitate the averagingof
credits across countrieswith differenttax rates.2
Previous studies of dividendrepatriationsemphasizethese tax factors.For example, Hines and
Hubbard(1990) analyze a cross-sectionof US multinationalsusing IRS data from 1984, finding
that tax considerationsaffect the timing of dividend repatriations.Othertax-focused studies of
dividend policy inside the firm, such as Altshuler,Newlon, and Randolph(1995), use repeated
cross-sections to distinguish effects associated with transitoryand permanentchanges in tax
costs. Altshulerand Grubert(2003) and Desai, Foley and Hines (2003) note that firms can defer
repatriationtax liabilities by investing foreign profits in other foreign affiliates rather than
repatriatingprofits to domestic parent companies and provide evidence of the proliferationof
organizationalformsthatfacilitatesuch deferral.Finally,Desai, Foley andHines (2001) calculate
the efficiency costs of repatriationtaxes using estimates of the responsivenessof repatriationsto
taxes in a panel setting.
There are strongreasonsto expect dividendrepatriationpolicies to reflectconsiderationsother
than tax factors. Since dividend repatriationsrepresentsignificantfinancial flows, repatriation
policies may reflect the financingconcerns of parentfirms that drawon subsidiarycash flows to
finance domestic expenses. Two examples of such domestic expenses are dividendpaymentsto
externalshareholdersand capital expendituresin home countries.Since externalfinance can be
quite costly, particularlyfor firms that are alreadymaintaininglarge amounts of external debt,
dividendrepatriationsfrom foreign affiliatesmay offer an attractivesource of finance for paying
dividends to common shareholdersand domestic investment expenditures, despite possible
associatedtax costs.
The desire to control corporatemanagersaroundthe world carriesimplicationsfor dividend
policies. A multinationalfirm's central managementcan use financialflows within the firm to
evaluatethe financialprospectsand needs of far-flungforeign affiliatesand to limit the discretion
of foreignmanagers.In a 1998 speech to countrymanagers,the CFO of Wyeth Pharmaceuticals
identified several mechanisms of diversion by country managers, including using vendors to
misappropriatecorporatefunds, employing unauthorizedsales programsand trade promotions
for personalbenefit, and transactingwith family-ownedfirms at the expense of the multinational
firm.3As this observation suggests, multinationalsmay find it sensible to mandate dividend
paymentsto police and monitorforeign managers,limit their abilityto misallocatefunds, and to
extractreturnson investments,in much the same way as public shareholdersuse dividendsto
monitorand controltheirfirms.

II.Dataand DescriptiveStatistics
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Annual Survey of US Direct InvestmentAbroad
from 1982 through2002 providesa panel of dataon the financialand operatingcharacteristicsof

2Somehost countries,particularlysome low-incomecountriesin the earlieryearsof the sample,limit dividendrepatriations
throughthe use of capital controls. Desai, Foley and Hines (2006) find that dividend repatriationsare responsive to tax
incentives controllingfor such policies.
3The speech by the Wyeth CFO was made public as part of a lawsuit brought by the general manager of the firm's
Swedish subsidiary,who alleged that he was demoted for revealing alleged improprietiesrelatedto the tax treatmentof
compensationof foreign managers.
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the foreign and domestic activities of US multinationalfirms.4The InternationalInvestmentand
Tradein Services SurveyAct requiresthatall firmsowning foreign affiliateswith sales, assets, or
net income greaterthan $7 million in 1999 file detailed financial and operatingitems for each
affiliate and informationon the value of transactionsbetween US parents and their foreign
affiliates. The availability of this information makes the BEA survey sample uniquely
comprehensive.
In the BEA survey,data on dividendpaymentsmade by affiliates reflect only those payments
to stockholdersdeclaredout of currentand priorperiod net income. Thus the data exclude other
types of capital movement, such as the repatriationof funds associated with the sale of equity.
Dividend payments from affiliates to their parent firms appear to be common, large, and
persistent.
Figure 1 plots the percentageof affiliatesthatreportpositive dividendsand the medianpayout
ratio among payers for two types of affiliates--majority owned incorporatedaffiliates and
branches-over the entiresampleperiod.Averagingacross the annualratesindicatesthat 31% of
majority-ownedincorporatedaffiliatesand 27% of branchespay dividends.The medianratio of
dividends to net income for payers (again averaging annual ratios across years) is 71% for
majority-ownedincorporatedaffiliates and 88% for branches.Foreign subsidiariesand foreign
branchesare somewhatequally likely to remit dividends,and do so with similarpayout ratios.
Dividend paymentsexhibit strong intertemporalpersistence.Averaging across years, 69% of
affiliatesthatpaid dividendsin one year paiddividendsagainthe following year.Figure2 displays
this ratefor each yearover the 1983-2002 period.This figure indicatesthatthe rateof persistence
remainshigh over the sample period.

III.EmpiricalDesign and Results
The regression analysis detailed in this section exploits the panel natureof the data. Table I
provides informationon the means, medians, and standarddeviations of variables used in the
empiricalwork.5
The Lintnerdividendmodel, first developed to analyze dividend paymentsfrom corporations
to various common shareholders,provides an analytic frameworkwith which to identify the
natureof repatriationpolicies. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997), among others, conclude
that "Lintner'smodel of dividends remainsthe best descriptionof the dividend setting process
available."Accordingly,this paperconsidersthe extent to which the Lintnermodel characterizes
the repatriationpolicies of multinationalaffiliates, paying particularattentionto how foreign
earningstranslateinto dividends.

4Detailedinformationon the data collected in this survey appearsin Appendix II of Desai, Foley and Hines (2002) and
in Mataloni(1995). US directinvestmentabroadis definedas the direct or indirectownershipor controlby a single US
legal entity of at least 10%of the voting securitiesof an incorporatedforeignbusiness enterpriseor the equivalentinterest
in an unincorporatedforeignbusiness enterprise.A US multinationalentity is the combinationof a single US legal entity
thathas made the directinvestment,called the US parent,and at least one foreign business enterprise,called the foreign
affiliate. The term affiliate refers to both subsidiaries,those affiliates incorporatedabroad,and unincorporatedbranch
affiliates.
5Minority-ownedforeignaffiliatesarenot partof the panel, as dividendpaymentsare not recordedfor these affiliates.The
sample is selected to omit affiliates with the highest 1%of net income and lowest 1%of net income each year in order
to enhancethe robustnessof the results.Also, calculatedcountrytax rates are constrainedto lie between 0% and 100%,
which entails adjustmentsto 226 affiliate-yearobservations.
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1.Propensity
to PayDividends
forMajority-Owned
Affiliates
and
Incorporated
Figure
(MOIAs)
1982-2002
Branches,
Diamonds and squaresindicate fractionsof entities that remit dividends for majorityowned incorporated
affiliates and branches,respectively.Trianglesand X's depict the median ratios of dividends to net income
for majorityowned incorporatedaffiliatesand branches,respectively.
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80.0%
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-x--- Medianratioof dividendsto net incomeforbranchesreportingpositivedividends

2. Persistence
ofDividend
1983-2002
Figure
Payments,
The line depicts the ratioof the numberof entitiesthatremitdividendsin yeart to the numberof entitiesthat
remit dividends in year t-1 and that also reportactivity in year t.
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics
PanelA presentsdescriptivestatistics for the affiliate-levelpanel of annualdatafrom 1982 to 2002 that are
analyzed in Tables II-V. Measures of dividends, net income and capital expendituresare in thousandsof
nominal U.S. dollars. Branch Dummy is equal to one for affiliates that are organized as branches, and
IndirectOwnershipDummy is equal to one for separatelyincorporatedaffiliatesfor which the parentholds
an indirect ownership claim. Parent Dividends to ShareholdersInteractedwith Relative Assets is the
interactionof parentdividendsto common shareholdersas reportedin Compustatand the ratio of affiliate
assets to consolidatedfirmassets as reportedin Compustat.Panel B presentsdescriptivestatisticsof parentlevel annualdata used in the analysis presentedin TableVI. Dividend paymentsby affiliatesto parentsand
affiliatenet income are aggregatedacross affiliates within parentsystems. Panel C displays affiliate-level
datathat are studied in columns 1-3 of TableVII. The PercentofAffiliate Dividend Paymentsis computed
across all years an affiliate appearsin the sample. Measures of countrytax rates and the log of GDP per
capita are averages of these variables for a particularaffiliate across years in which the affiliate appearsin
the sample. The PartialOwnershipDummy is equal to one if the affiliate is ever partiallyowned. Panel D
presentssample statisticsfor the subsampleof the sample describedin Panel C for which parentsincrease
theirpaid-in capital in the affiliate. Results of analyzingthese data appearin columns 4-6 of TableVII.
Panel A. Affiliate-levelDatafor TablesII-V

Dividend Paymentsby Affiliates to Parents
Net Income
CapitalExpenditures
BranchDummy
IndirectOwnershipDummy
ParentDividends to Shareholders
Interactedwith RelativeAssets

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

6,677
7,580
9,064
0.0646
0.1594
4,451

0
1,773
985
0.0000
0.0000
749

47,127
25,572
41,192
0.2458
0.3661
18,692

39,308

0

227,059

58,534
0.5699

4,964
0.5555

297,093
0.2600

Panel B. Parent-levelDatafor Table VI
AggregateDividend Payments
by Affiliates to Parents
AggregateNet Income
ParentLeverage

Panel C. Affiliate-levelData for Columns1-3, Table VII
PercentofAffiliate Dividend Paymentsthat
are Positive
CountryTax Rate
PartialOwnershipDummy
Log of GDP Per Capita

0.2880
0.3277
0.1893
9.4158

0.2000
0.3436
0.0000
9.8016

0.3054
0.1176
0.3917
0.9382

Panel D. Affiliate-levelData for Columns4-6, Table VII
Dummy For Paymentof Dividend by
Affiliates when Paid-inCapitalIncreases
CountryTax Rate
PartialOwnershipDummy
Log of GDP Per Capita

0.2821
0.3328
0.1227
9.4077

0.0000
0.3415
0.0000
9.7986
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The first step in identifying the dividend policies of foreign affiliates is to estimate the
parametersassociated with the Lintnerframework.The essential featuresof the Lintnermodel
are that tax and nontax variablesdetermineboth the targetpayout ratios and the rates at which
actual dividends adjust to desired dividends. Thus, it is possible to generalize the Lintner
frameworkby estimatingthe parametersof payout functionsthat differbetween affiliates,based
on observable characteristicsof affiliates and parent companies. Extension of the framework
demonstratesthe extent to which tax motivations,domestic financingand investmentneeds, and
control problemsinfluencetargetpayoutratios and rates of adjustment.6

A. PayoutPolicies of ForeignAffiliates
Table II displays the results of estimatinga Lintnerdividend equationfor all majority-owned
affiliates, assuming all affiliates have identical dividend payout equations. Since the Lintner
specification includes lagged dividends as an explanatoryvariable, the 102,380 affiliate-year
observations exclude those affiliates that appear only once in the sample, and the initial
observationsof all affiliates, includingall 1982 observations.
The Lintnerspecificationfits the data quite well.7 The estimated0.2263 coefficient on lagged
dividends in the regression reported in column 1 implies that affiliates pay dividends with
adjustmentparametersequal to (1 - 0.23), or 0.77. The affiliate's desired steady-statepayout
ratio is given by the ratio of the estimated coefficient on net income (0.37) and the estimated
adjustmentparameter.In the case of the estimates reportedin column one, the implied desired
steady-statepayout ratio is (0.37/0.77), or 48%.
This regression is repeatedin columns 2 and 3, introducingfixed effects for parentfirms and
for affiliates, respectively, to control for unobservable characteristicsthat might influence
dividendpolicy at the parentor affiliatelevel. Althoughthe resultswith parent-firmfixed effects
are not notably differentfrom the results in column 1, includingthe affiliatefixed effects sharply
reducesthe magnitudeof the estimatedcoefficient on lagged dividends,presumablyby removing
much of the variationin lagged dividends. Since the smallermagnitudeis largely an artifactof
the shortnessof the panel, the subsequentanalysis incorporatesparent-firm,ratherthanaffiliate,
fixed effects. The Tobitspecificationof the basic Lintnerregressionequationpresentedin column
4 provides qualitativelysimilarresults.
Dividend policy is one componentof an overall financialpolicy that includes decisions about
net borrowing,capitalexpenditures,andothersourcesanduses of funds.It is possible thatforeign
affiliates with attractiveinvestmentopportunitiesfinance their new capital expenditureslargely

6Earlycross-sectional studies, such as Fama and Babiak (1968), report systematic differences between firms in the
parametersof the Lintner functions that characterizetheir dividend payouts. Dewenter and Warther(1998) interpret
differences in adjustmentparametersas evidence of the impact of Japanesefinancial policies in their comparisonof
keiretsu and non-keiretsufirms. Fama and French (2002) use Lintner-likespecificationsto test the implicationsof the
pecking ordertheory of capital structure.Table VII of Desai, Foley, and Hines (2002) presentsresults from estimating
separatefirm-specific Lintnerparametersfor each multinationalgroup in the BEA panel, reportingfindingsthat match
those obtainedfrom regressionsin which each firm is restrictedto having the same parameters(which vary accordingto
observablefirm characteristics).
7Thebasic Lintnerspecificationin column (1) of Table2 omits a constantterm. In his originalstudy of dividends,Lintner
includeda constant,but he examinedthe behaviorof aggregatedividends,not dividendsof individualfirms. Subsequent
researchpresentssome evidence in favor of including a constant(see, for example, Choe (1990)) and some evidence in
favor of suppressingit (see, for example, Fama and Babiak (1968)). The results presentedhere do not materiallychange
if a constant is included. For an analysis of these data using a Lintnerspecificationthat includes a constant, see Desai,
Foley, and Hines (2001).
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TableII.LintnerDividendSpecificationsfor AffiliatePaymentsto ParentFirms
Thedependentvariablein all specificationsis the dollarvalueof dividendpaymentsby majority-owned
affiliates.Net Incomeis the after-foreigntax net incomeof the affiliate.LaggedDividendPayments
is the dollarvalue of dividendpaymentsby the affiliatein the previousyear.Column1 presentsan
OLS specificationwithoutfixed effects. Column2 presentsan OLS specificationwith parentfixed
effects. Column3 presentsan OLS specificationwith affiliatefixed effects. In columns1 through3,
standarderrorsarein parentheses.
Column4 presentsa Tobitspecification
heteroskedasticity-consistent
withstandard
errorspresentedin parentheses.
(1)

(2)

Net Income

0.3694***
(0.0177)

0.3585***
(0.0183)

LaggedDividendPayments

0.2263***
(0.0328)

FixedEffects?
OLSorTobit?
R- Squared
Log-Likelihood
No. Obs
PayoutRatio
AdjustmentParameter
*** Significant
at the0.01level.

(3)

(4)

0.3019***
(0.0201)

0.2843***
(0.0186)

0.2139***

0.1136***

0.2267***

(0.0334)

(0.0359)

(0.0339)

No
OLS
0.3358

Yes-Parent
OLS
0.3236

Yes-Affiliate
OLS
0.4378

102,380
0.48

102,380
0.46

102,380
0.34

-435,969
102,380
0.37

0.77

0.79

0.89

0.77

No
Tobit

by reducing or omitting dividends to parent companies. If so, and if capital expendituresare
correlatedover time, then the estimateddividend equationsdisplayed in Table II and elsewhere
might reflect the impactof changing investmentpatterns.
Table III presentsthe results of a numberof regressions designed to explore this possibility.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table III show the estimatedcoefficients for equationsthat are identical to
those in columns 1 and 2 of TableII, except that in TableIII affiliatecapitalexpenditureis added
as an explanatoryvariable. Including this variable has very little impact on the estimated net
income and lagged dividend coefficients, which are almost identical to the values reportedin
Table II. Furthermore,the estimated effects of affiliate capital expendituresare positive in the
regressionsreportedin columns 1 and 2 of TableIII. These effects are inconsistentwith a simple
model in which dividendrepatriationsrepresentfunds not used for foreign capitalexpenditures.
It is not necessary for foreign affiliates with attractiveinvestment opportunitiesto reduce
planned dividend payments to their American parent firms, since they can finance capital
expenditures,as well as dividends,by net borrowing.Columns3 through6 of TableIII reportthe
results of the regressionswhere the sample of foreign affiliates is distinguishedby the extent of
local indebtedness.Affiliates with local debt/asset ratios that exceed median values for their
industriesare classified as having "high"local debt, while others are classified as having "low"
local debt. Affiliates with high local debt/asset ratios may have the least ability to use capital
marketsto obtainadditionalfinancingfor theiractivities, andthereforemight exhibit the greatest
impactof capital expenditureson dividends.
The results reportedin columns 3 and 4 of Table III indicate that affiliates with considerable
debt have dividendpayoutratiosthatare higherand more sensitive to income thanare the payout
ratios of affiliates with little debt. The 0.3167 and 0.0943 coefficients in column 4 imply that
heavily indebted affiliates increase their dividend repatriationsby $0.41 for every additional
dollarof foreignincome,whereasaffiliateswithoutheavy debtobligationsincreasetheirdividend
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Table III.Dividend Payments, Capital Expenditures, and Local Debt
Thedependentvariablein all specificationsis the dollarvalueof dividendpaymentsby majority-owned
affiliatesto parents.Net Incomeis the after-foreigntax net incomeof the affiliate.LaggedDividend
Paymentsis the dollar value of dividendpaymentsby the affiliate in the previousyear. Capital
is the dollarvalueof capitalexpenditures
Expenditures
performedby the affiliate.TheHighLocalDebt
Dummyis computedby firstcalculatingtheratioof an affiliate'slocaldebtto its assets.An affiliatethat
has a ratiohigherthanthe medianin its industryin a particularyearis assigneda valueof one while an
affiliatewith a ratiobelow the medianis assigneda value of zero. Columns1, 3, and 5 presentOLS
specificationswithoutfixed effects.Columns2, 4, and6 presentOLSspecificationswith parentfixed
effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standarderrorsarepresentedin parentheses.

Net Income

(1)

(2)

0.3613***

0.3523***

(0.0174)

(0.0181)

(3)
0.3265***
(0.0248)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.3167*** 0.3195*** 0.3115***
(0.0256)

(0.0244)

(0.0253)

Lagged Dividend
Payments

0.2232*** 0.2113*** 0.2232*** 0.2117*** 0.2212*** 0.2101***
(0.0330)
(0.0336)
(0.0535)
(0.0546)
(0.0538)
(0.0548)

CapitalExpenditures

0.0207**
(0.0081)

0.0192**
(0.0085)

0.0203
(0.0126)

0.0182
(0.0129)

High Local Debt
Dummy Interacted
with Net Income

0.0979*** 0.0943*** 0.0975*** 0.0939***
(0.0354)
(0.0358)
(0.0351)
(0.0355)

HighLocalDebtDummy
Interacted
withLagged
DividendPayments

0.0027
(0.0641)

HighLocalDebtDummy
Interacted
withCapital
Expenditures
ParentFixedEffects?
R-Squared
No. Obs

No
0.3364
101,913

Yes
0.3241
101,913

No
0.3392
98,272

0.0014
(0.0643)

Yes
0.3260
98,272

0.0015
(0.0644)

0.0002
(0.0646)

-0.0043
(0.0159)

-0.0028
(0.0160)

No
0.3397
97,805

Yes
0.3263
97,805

*** Significant
atthe0.01 level.
** Significant
atthe0.05 level.

repatriationsby $0.32 for every additionaldollarof foreignincome. Includingcapitalexpenditures
and their interactionwith high local borrowing,in the regressions reportedin columns 5 and 6
has very little effect on these results. The regressionreportedin column 6 of Table III indicates
thatonce affiliatedebt levels aretakeninto account,affiliatecapitalexpenditureshave statistically
insignificant effects on dividend repatriations.In cases of heavily indebted affiliates, affiliate
capitalexpenditureshave slightly smallereffects on dividendrepatriationsthanthey do for other
affiliates.

B. Tax Motivations
Since firms have incentives to organize internal fund transfers in tax-conscious ways, tax
considerationsare likely to influence dividend policies inside firms. The tax consequences of
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paying dividends are functions of affiliate organizationalforms, whetherparentcompanies own
affiliates directly or indirectly,and local tax rates. The regressionsreportedin TableIV include
interactionsof net incomeand lagged dividendswith dummyvariablesfor branchesandindirectly
owned incorporatedaffiliates. These interactionterms identify the extent to which dividend
payout behaviordiffersbetween affiliateswith differentorganizationalforms and, consequently,
differing tax motivations. The regressions also measure the extent to which dividends from
branch affiliates and indirectly owned affiliates are more or less sensitive to foreign tax rate
differencesthan are dividends from directlyowned subsidiaries.
Foreigntax ratesarelikely to have lesser effects on dividendrepatriationsfrombranchaffiliates
and indirectly owned affiliates than they are on dividend repatriationsfrom directly owned
subsidiaries.Dividendrepatriationsby foreignbranchesdo not have US tax consequences,since
the United States taxes foreign branch income independent of whether it is repatriatedas
dividends. Dividend payments from foreign affiliates that American companies own indirectly
throughother foreign affiliates will not trigger a home countrytax liability unless the recipient
resides in a jurisdictionthat taxes foreign source income. Since many of the foreign affiliatesof
American corporationsthat are conduits for indirectownership are located in countriesthat do
not tax foreign income, it is unlikely that dividend payments from affiliates to indirectowners
generateUS tax liabilities.8
The results reportedin column 1 of Table IV suggest that organizationalform differences
have only very minor implications for the general nature of dividend payout processes.9The
estimated 0.0425 coefficient on the interactionof the branchdummy variable and affiliate net
income is positive but small and statistically insignificant. The estimated coefficient on the
interaction of the branch dummy and lagged dividends is also insignificant. The estimated
coefficients on variables that interact dummy variables for indirect ownership are likewise
relatively small and insignificant.'0Thus the correspondingimplied desired payout ratios and
adjustment parameters for directly owned incorporated affiliates, branches, and indirectly
owned affiliates are all very close to each other. This regression implies that affiliates with
different forms of parentownership and very differenttax motivations exhibit similar dividend
payout policies.
In Table IV, columns 3 and 5 repeat these regressions, but introducefixed effects for parent
firmsand a Tobitspecificationof the regressionequationin place of OLS. The resultsare similar
to those reportedin column 1, in that coefficients on organizationalform interactionsremain
insignificant.

8SeeAltshulerand Grubert(2003) and Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003).
9Thisexercise takes an affiliate's organizationalform to be independentof its repatriationpolicy. Multinationalfirms
choose whether to make their affiliates foreign branches or foreign subsidiaries;to the extent that these choices are
dictatedby anticipatedfuturerepatriationrates, then a comparisonof repatriationrates between affiliateswith different
organizationalforms will overstate the impact of tax rate differences. Other characteristicsdiffer between branches
and subsidiariesthat could be correlatedwith tax rates and repatriationproclivities. Branchaffiliates are concentrated
in certain industries,includingpetroleum,wholesale trade, and services, though not entirely; in the 1997 sample, 26.4
% of branch affiliates were in non-petroleummanufacturing,comparedwith 52.1 % of incorporatedaffiliates. While
the geographic distributionof branchesand subsidiarieswas not identical, the median foreign tax rate paid by branch
affiliatesin 1997 was 30.4 %, comparedto 31.1% for incorporatedaffiliates.Based on this informationthereis no strong
reason to suspect thata comparisonof the repatriationpatternsof branchesand subsidiarieswould encounterdifficulties
due to spuriouscorrelationwith local tax rates.
'0As defined in these regressions, indirect ownership correspondsto zero direct ownership by the parent company.
Changingthe dummyvariableto indicateany nonzero indirectownershipdoes not change the results.
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Investigating country-level variation in the tax cost of paying dividends provides a finer
measureof the importanceof tax motivationsfor affiliates.The regressionreportedin column 2
of Table IV includes country tax rates interactedwith affiliate net income in addition to the
variables used in the regressions reported in column 1. Country tax rates are measured by
calculatingratiosof foreign income taxes paidto the sum of foreign income taxes and net income
for each affiliate observation.Medians of these rates are then used as country-levelobservations
for each country and year." For the purposes of calculating country tax rates, affiliates with
negative net income are excluded. High foreign tax rates reduce the cost of paying dividends
from directly held foreign subsidiariesto Americanparentcompanies, since doing so generates
accompanyingforeigntax creditsthat offset the associatedUS tax liability.
The results reportedin column 2 of TableIV confirmthat tax costs affect the long-runpayout
ratiosof incorporatedaffiliates.The estimated0.4085 coefficient on the interactionof countrytax
rates and net income reportedin column 2 is both large and statistically significant,indicating
thataffiliatesset higherpayoutratiosin countrieswherepayingdividendsgenerateslargerforeign
tax credits and therefore lower home country tax liabilities.12Examining the value of the
interactionof countrytax rates and net income across organizationalforms provides additional
evidence of the impactof home countrytax considerationson affiliate dividend payments.The
estimated-0.5058 coefficient on the interactionof countrytax rates,net income, and the indirect
ownership dummy variable implies that tax rates do not influence payout ratios of indirectly
owned affiliates. The sum of this coefficient and the coefficient on the countrytax rate interacted
with net income is -0.0973, and it does not differsignificantlyfrom zero. This resultis consistent
with the tax incentives facing indirectlyowned affiliates, and the way in which they differ from
the incentives of separately incorporatedaffiliates. The estimated -0.0469 coefficient on the
interactionof countrytax rates, net income, and the branchdummy indicatesthat tax effects on
repatriationsare also mitigated in the case of foreign branches,which is consistent with their
incentives. Including parent-firmfixed effects in column 4 and using a Tobit specification in
column 6 producessimilarresults.13In these specifications,the payout ratiosof branchesand the
indirectlyowned affiliatesdo not vary with tax rates in a statisticallysignificantway.
The evidence indicatesthat incorporatedaffiliates adjust long-runpayout ratios to reflect tax
costs. The absence of such effects on the payoutratiosof branchesand indirectlyowned affiliates
is consistent with the importanceof tax motivations.Nonetheless, the similarityof the dividend
policies of affiliates with different organizationalforms, and thus different tax treatments,
indicates that tax motivations do not fully account for patterns of dividend policies inside
firms.14

"Affiliates with negative net income are excluded for the purposes of calculating country tax rates. Desai, Foley, and
Hines (2001) provide a complete description of the properties of country tax rates and alternativemethods of their
calculation.
'2TheUS Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the way in which foreign tax credits were calculated,as a result of which,
firmsfaced strongerincentivesto adjusttheirdividendrepatriationsin responseto transitorytax ratechanges before 1986
than they did after 1986. Additionalregressions (available from the authors)indicate that repatriationsrespondedmore
sharplyto tax differencesin the years before 1986 thanthey did after 1986.
13Desai,Foley, and Hines (2001) note that tax incentives may vary between affiliates located in the same country.
Incorporatingthis variation, along with instrumentingfor the affiliate tax rate with a country tax rate, provides an
additionaltest of the tax motivationsof dividend policy inside the firm- althoughthe results are largelyunchanged.
14Somecountriesalso impose small withholding taxes on repatriationsfrom foreign subsidiariesand foreign branches.
Using the BEA data to measurethe magnitudeof these withholdingtax rates, and addingwithholdingtaxes as separate
independentvariables, produces results (available from the authors) that indicate that withholding taxes discourage
repatriations,thoughthe effects of othervariablesclosely resemble those reportedin the paper.
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C. Parent Company Cash Needs
One straightforwardexplanation for the presence of Lintner-likepatterns inside the firm is
that the demands of the many and varied shareholdersin public capital marketstranslate into
demands for dividend repatriationsinside the firm. Parent firms that feel obligated to pay
dividends to common shareholders might draw on financial resources available in foreign
affiliates, therebytriggeringdividendrepatriations.In view of the widely documentedtendency
to pay greaterdividends out of $1 of foreign earningsthan $1 of domestic earnings,this process
is likely to be strongest in cases of firms with significant foreign earnings."5
Anotherpossibility
is that parent companies with attractive domestic investment opportunities draw on the
resources of their foreign affiliates, and these resource flows take the form of dividend
repatriations.
Figure 3 illustratesthese possibilities. The heights of the bars in the figuremeasurethe fraction
of domestic parent companies that receive nonzero dividends from their foreign affiliates,
grouping parent firms into terciles in two different ways. The left-hand bar provided for each
tercile gives information for firms characterizedby the ratio of parent payouts to common
external shareholdersto parentdomestic after-taxearnings.The right-handbar for each tercile
presents information for firms characterizedby the attractiveness of domestic investment
opportunities,which are measuredby Tobin's q, higher values of q correspondingto greater
desired investment.'6Figure3 shows thatthe parentcompanieswith the highest dividendpayout
ratios are the most likely to receive dividend repatriationsfrom their foreign affiliates. Greater
investmentopportunitiesare also associatedwith a higher likelihoodof repatriationfromforeign
affiliates, which again suggests that parent companies use repatriationsto satisfy their cash
needs. Since the patternspresentedin Figure 3 do not control for affiliateprofitabilityand other
characteristicsthat are likely to influence repatriations,to identify more precisely the impact of
cash demandby parentcompanies it is necessary to include these characteristicsas independent
variables.
Comparingthe dividendpolicies of affiliateswhose parentshave differentdegrees of exposure
to public capital marketstests the hypothesis that needs for domestic financialresourcesto pay
dividends to common shareholdersare strong enough to drive repatriationpolicies. Table V
reportsthe results of affiliate payout regressionsthat take explicit account of the ownershipof
parents companies, and, in the case of publicly held companies, their dividend policies. The
dependentvariable in the regressions in TableV is dividend repatriationsfrom affiliatesto their
parents.To capturethose affiliatesthat do not face the demandsof public shareholders,Column
1 of TableV is limitedto the sampleof affiliateswhose parentsdo not appearin Compustat."7
The
implied desired steady-statepayoutratios(0.39) and adjustmentparameters(0.80) of affiliatesof
these private firms are similar to the desired payout ratios (0.51) and adjustmentparameters
(0.74) of affiliates whose parentsare listed in Compustat,as reportedin column 2. Since firms
'5SeeHines (1996), who reportsthat $1 of foreign profitabilityhas 3-4 times the effect on dividendpaymentsto common
shareholdersthan does $1 of domestic profitability.Hines attributesthe difference to the use of dividends to signal
profitability,which may be more difficult for the marketto verify in the case of foreign earnings;Bodnarand Weintrop
(1997) attributethe same phenomenonto the greatergrowthprospectsof foreign earnings.
16Valuesof q are measuredas the ratioof the book value of assets plus the differenceof marketand book values of equity
to the book value of assets. These firm-level q's are categorizedinto three-digitBEA industrycategories, and the median
firmvalue of q within an industryis the industrylevel q. Firm-levelregressions(not reported)of domestic investmenton
this measureofq provide a positive and significantcoefficient on q.
'7Whileit is possible that such non-Compustatfirms are not privatelyheld but are insteadforeign-basedand thereforenot
listed on an Americanexchange, manualinspectionof the data suggest thatthis is rarelythe case.
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PoliciesandParent-Firm
3.Repatriation
Needs
Figure
Financing
Figure3 showsthe shareof parentfirmsthatreceivedividendsfromaffiliateswithinterciles.The left
columnfor each tercilecorrespondsto a groupingof firmsbasedon the ratioof parentdividendsto
shareholders
to parentnet income.Therightcolumnfor eachtercilecorresponds
to a groupingof firms
basedon parent-firm
industryq.
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[ Terciles based on parentdividends to external shareholders
L Terciles based on parentindustryq

that are not publicly tradedpresumablyface little capital marketpressure to pay dividends to
their owners, but neverthelessexhibit similarbehavioralpatterns,this comparisonsuggests that
capital market pressuresare unlikely to account for estimated affiliate payout equations. The
similarityof the dividendpolicies of the foreign affiliates of private and public parentspersists
when parent-firmfixed effects are included,as reportedin columns 4 and 5 of TableV, and in the
Tobitspecificationsreportedin columns 7 and 8.
Columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table V reportthe estimated coefficients from payout equations for
affiliates of Compustatfirms. These columns include a variable intended to captureparental
financial pressure stemming from financial flows to common shareholdersas an independent
variable.The variable"ParentDividends to ShareholdersInteractedwith RelativeAssets" is the
productof parent-firmdividendsand the ratioof affiliateassets to total firm assets. If parentfirms
financedividendsto shareholderswith fundsdrawnfromall partsof the firmin proportionto assets,
then an affiliateshouldbe expectedto remita dividendto its parentfirm thatis equalto the value
of this variable.Hence, if parent-firmpressuresdeterminerepatriationpolicies in this manner,the
estimatedcoefficienton this variablewould be close to unity.
The estimated coefficients on "ParentDividends to ShareholdersInteractedwith Relative
Assets" in the OLS specificationsequal roughly0.14, thus differingsignificantlyfrom one at the
5% level. As measuredby dividends to common shareholders,parent-firmfinancial pressures
explain some, but only a modest portion, of affiliate dividend payouts. In addition, the
estimates of desired steady-statepayout ratios and adjustmentparametersare not significantly
affected by including the "parentdividends"variable on the right-handside. The OLS results
reportedin columns 3 and6 of TableV differsomewhatfromthe Tobitresultsreportedin column
9, since the estimatedcoefficients from the Tobitspecificationsuggest thataffiliatedividends are
higherwhen parent-firmdividendsare smaller.Takentogether,the resultsin TableV indicatethat

This content downloaded from 141.211.57.224 on Wed, 14 Jan 2015 13:06:28 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

FinancialManagement* Spring2007

20
7) in

and
parent
and
sample
of
4
(9)
NoTobit
Interacted
Firms
75,868
1, affiliate
parent-firm Affiliates
with
(0.0258)
(0.0404)
(0.0583)
The
-336,040
0.3516***
0.2726***
-0.2559***
Compustat
the
with
of
parent. specifications,
(columns affiliates
theall
of
(8)
NoTobit
Shareholders
Tobit
income
Firms
76,034
of
(0.0210)
(0.0388)
-336,537
Policyfirms to is
0.3012***
0.2603***
Affiliates
Compustat
net
specifications
tax assets present
9
columns
OLS
Dividends
Non(7)
NoTobit
and
Dividend
Firms
26,344
-99,124
(0.0273)
(0.0404)
of
8,
other
0.1993***
0.1861***
Affiliates
Compustat
non-Compustat
7,
Parent
all present
consolidated
of after-foreign
6
in
Affiliatetheyear.
total and
is
of
(6)
YesOLS
to 5 Columns
Firms
on affiliates sample
0.361675,868
4,
(0.0410)
(0.0218)
(0.0375)
0.3542***
Affiliates
0.2393***
0.1334***
Compustat
the
previous
assets
Affiliate
Policy of the
Columns
while
in
(5)
YesOLS
affiliate parentheses. of Firms
0.359276,034
in
(0.0206)
(0.0379)
of
0.3760***
0.2454***
Affiliates
Income effects.
majority-owned
Compustat
affiliate
by
Dividend
Nettheratio
appear
Compustat,
fixed
9). by theby
Non(4)
YesOLS
errors
Firms
0.257026,344
and with
(0.0261)
(0.0397)
of
payments
0.2944***
0.1732***
Affiliates
without
8,
listed
Compustat
6,
not
5, payments
Parent-Firm
standard
are
3,
dividend
of
(3)
NoOLS
and of 2, shareholders
Firms
0.377675,868
(0.0212)
(0.0374)
(0.0369)
dividend
firms
specifications
Affiliates
0.3565***
0.2483***
0.1423***
to
Compustat
value of
OLS
(columnsparent
value
dollar dividends
of
(2)
NoOLS
firms
Firms
0.374676,034
Ownership
present
(0.0200)
(0.0373)
the dollarwhose
0.2561***
0.3827***
Affiliates
3
Compustat
of is is
and
2 heteroskedasticity-consistent
parent-firm
affiliates
1, 6,
Compustat
Non(1)
NoOLS
Impact of of to
Firms
0.224826,344
Payments
(0.0255)
(0.0385)
of
0.3143***
0.2010***
Affiliates
specifications
Compustat
The
through
Columns
product
V. all
1 parentheses.
restricted
in affiliates
level.
theis
Dividend
in
is 7
0.01
Table
Payments
to
Assets
columns
and
the
appear
variable
Lagged
4 Compustat.
at
Assets
Interacted
In
Effects?
ofAffiliates
1, by
year.
errors
DividendDividends
Tobit?
majority-owned
Relative
Fixed
listed
effects.
or
Relative
dependent
Obs.Significant
forsame
Income
columns
with
Shareholders
OLS
in firms
standard
Parent
R-Squared
Log-Likelihood
Lagged Parent
No. ***
The
andthewith
fixed
Net

This content downloaded from 141.211.57.224 on Wed, 14 Jan 2015 13:06:28 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Firm
Desai, Foley,& Hines * DividendPolicyInsidethe Multinational

21

the dividendpolicies of affiliates of privatelyowned parentsare similarto the dividendpolicies
of affiliateswhose parentfirms are publicly owned.18
Multinationalfirmsthatwish to expanddomestic investmentare able to drawon the resources
of their foreign affiliates. In turn, these financing needs might dictate repatriationpolicies,
particularlyif parentfirmsare otherwisefinanciallyconstrained.To evaluatethis possibility,it is
usefulto examinehow repatriationpolicies varyas a functionof domesticinvestmentopportunities
and limited access to additional external investment funds. Highly leveraged firms have been
emphasized in previous studies of the role of financing constraints in limiting investment
responsesto profitableopportunities.19
Accordingly,the regressionsin TableVI analyze whether
highly levered parentfirms repatriatefunds from their foreign affiliates when facing attractive
domestic investmentopportunities,and measurethe extent to which such repatriationsaccount
for the regularpatternsof payout policy.
The dependentvariablein the regressionsreportedin TableVI is total repatriationsreceived by
parentcompanies from all of their foreign affiliates. Since these regressionsconsiderthe impact
of financing needs at the parent-companylevel, the unit of observation is a parent-yearcell.
Column I of TableVI reportsa regressionthat is an aggregated(at the parent-firmlevel) version
of the regression reportedin column 2 of Table II, with a similar estimated coefficient on net
income anda somewhatlargercoefficienton lagged dividends.The regressionreportedin column
2 of Table VI adds an interactionbetween affiliate income and parent-firmleverage, where
parent-firmleverage is defined as the ratio of total domestic liabilities to total domestic assets
reportedto the BEA. The estimatedcoefficients on aggregateaffiliatenet income and aggregate
lagged dividends reportedin column 2 imply that parentfirms with zero leverage have a target
payoutratioof 50.8%,in contrastto the impliedtargetpayoutratiofrom column 1 of 61.1%.The
coefficients in column 2 also imply that targetpayout ratios are a function of leverage, as firms
with leverage ratiosof one have targetpayout ratiosof 70.9%.20
In evaluatingwhetherfinanciallyconstrainedfirmsdeploy foreignresourcesto financedomestic
investment, it is useful to consider the combined impact of leverage and currentinvestment
opportunities. The regressions in columns 3 and 4 are estimated on separate samples. The
observationsin column3 consist of firmswith domesticactivityprimarilyclassified in three-digit
industry-yearcells with above-medianvalues ofTobin's q. The observationsin column4 comprise
firmswith domestic activityprimarilyclassified in industry-yearcells with below-medianvalues
of Tobin'sq. The estimatedimpactof parentleverage differs sharplybetween these two samples.
The -0.0236 coefficient in column 3 suggests that greaterparent-firmleverage slightly reduces
the effect of foreign income on repatriationsby affiliates of parentcompanies in industrieswith
low q 's, but the 0.1208 coefficient in column 4 implies that greaterleverage is associatedwith
significantlygreaterrepatriationsby firms in industrieswith high q 's.21

'8Desai,Foley, and Hines (2002) reportsimilarpatternsin their analysis of the impactof ownershiptransitions,as when
privatefirmsare takenpublicand publicly owned firmsare takenprivatein leveragedbuyouts.Neithertype of ownership
transitionappearsto be associatedwith significantchanges in dividendpolicies.
'9See,for example, Lang,Ofek and Stulz (1996).
2The 70.9% targetpayoutratio is calculatedas (0.2729+0.1074)/(1-0.4633). A comparisonof leverage ratios from zero
to one encompasses95 % of the sample.
21Theq measureof investmentopportunitiesis derivedfromfirm-leveldataand,as a consequence,capturesfirmworldwide
investmentopportunitiesratherthan merely domestic investmentopportunities.Since the majorityof investment and
businessactivityby Americanfirmsis domestic,it follows thatmeasuredq primarilyreflectsdomesticopportunities,but it is
possible thathigh values of q could be associatedwith greaterdesiredforeigninvestment,which would reducethe incentive
to repatriatefundsfromabroad,andreducethe effect of investmentopportunitieson repatriationsas measuredin TableVI.
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Table VI. Lintner Dividend Specifications for Aggregate Affiliate Payments to
Parent Firms
The dependentvariablein all specifications
is the dollarvalueof dividendpaymentsby majority-owned
affiliatesaggregated
acrossaffiliatesin a parent-firm
aftersystem.AggregateNet Incomeis theaggregated
system.ParentLeverageis the ratioof parent-firm
foreigntaxnet incomeof affiliateswithina parent-firm
domesticcurrentliabilitiesandlongtermdebtto parent-firm
domesticassets.AggregateLaggedDividend
Paymentsis the aggregateddollarvalueof dividendpaymentsby affiliateswithina parent-firm
systemin
thepreviousyear.All of thespecifications
areOLSspecifications
withparent-firm
fixedeffects.Thesample
in the firsttwo columnsincludesall parentfirmsin all years.Columns3 and 4 split the sampleinto
subsamplesdependingon whethera parentfirm'sindustryq is below or above the samplemedian,
standard
errorsappearin parentheses.
respectively.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent
Full Sample

Sample
AggregateNet Income

No. Obs

High q Sample

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.3260***
(0.0046)

0.2729***
(0.0101)

0.4555***
(0.0168)

0.1989***
(0.0148)

0.1074***
(0.0181)

-0.0236
(0.0290)

0.1208***
(0.0274)

0.4662***
(0.0064)

0.4633***
(0.0065)

0.1817***
(0.0079)

0.6312***
(0.0105)

Yes
0.8304

Yes
0.8307

Yes
0.8891

Yes
0.8246

17,747

17,310

8,355

8,365

Interaction
of AggregateNet
IncomeandParentLeverage
AggregateLaggedDividend
Payments
ParentFixedEffects?
R- Squared

Low q Sample

*** Significant
atthe0.01 level.

The evidence in Table VI indicates that the combination of high leverage and significant
investmentopportunitiesmotivatesfirmsto increasetargetpayoutratiosfortheirforeignaffiliates.
Although the regressions reportedin Table VI provide evidence that foreign earnings are an
importantsource of finance for domestic investment,these results also indicate that the Lintner
process that characterizesdividendrepatriationsis not a manifestationof this financingchannel
alone. The coefficients in columns 3 and4 indicatethatfirmswith no leverageand above-average
investment opportunities still pursue Lintner-like policies, as do firms with below-average
investment opportunitiesregardlessof their leverage. Consequentlyit is necessary to entertain
additionalexplanationsfor the determinantsof dividends inside the firm.
D. Dividends and Incomplete Ownership
Incomplete ownershipof foreign affiliatesreduces the ability of parentcompaniesto monitor
and control foreign managers. Partial ownership of foreign affiliates by local firms in host
countries increases the risk that a managerwill pursuerelated-partytransactionsthat are not in
the interestof the multinationalparents.In such a setting, a rigid repatriationpolicy may help to
control foreign managementby limiting its financialdiscretion.
This section studies the extent to which multinationalsuse regular dividend payments to
mitigate problems arising from incomplete ownership. In order to do so, the regularity of
dividendsis measuredby calculatingthe fractionof years in which dividendsarepaid by affiliates
that appearin the sample at least five times. The first three regressions in Table VII reportthe
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TableVII.Dividendsand PartialOwnership
Thesamplein columns1-3consistsof all affiliatesthatreportdividendsfive ormoretimes.Thedependent
dividendpaymentsthatarepositive.Incolumns1-3,Country
variableincolumns1-3is theshareof reported
TaxRateis the mediantaxratein the countryin whichan affiliateis locatedaveragedoverall yearsthat
affiliateappearsin thesample.PartialOwnership
Dummytakesthevalueof oneif theaffiliateis notwholly
ownedin anyof theyearstheaffiliateappearsinthesample.Logof GDPPerCapitais thelog valueof GDP
percapitaaveragedoverall yearstheaffiliateappearsin thesample.Thesamplein columns4-6 consistsof
of theaffiliate.Thedependent
variablein
thoseaffiliate-years
wherea parentincreasesthepaid-in-capital
columns4-6 is a dummythattakesthe valueone if the affiliatepays a dividendin thatyear,andzero
measuresof theindependent
variablesareused.Heteroskedasticityotherwise.Incolumns4-6,time-varying
errorsappearin parentheses.
consistentstandard

Dependent
Variable
Constant
CountryTax Rate

Percent of Affiliate Dividend
Payments that are Positive
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.2695***
(0.0090)
0.0566**
(0.0262)

0.2551***
(0.0091)
0.0465*
(0.0260)
0.0934***

0.5385***
(0.0342)
0.0767***
(0.0296)
0.0851***

-0.7453***
(0.0390)
0.5093***
(0.1102)

(0.0083)

PartialOwnership

Dummy
Logof GDPPer
Capita
No. Obs.
Log-Likelihood
R-squared

Dummy For Payment of Dividend
by Affiliates when Paid-in Capital
Increases

10,513

10,513

(0.0084)
-0.0310***
(0.0036)
10,162

0.0005

0.0148

0.0236

(5)

(0.0352)
12,090
-7,188

(6)

-0.8023*** -0.2011
(0.0393)
(0.1267)
0.4836*** 0.6394***
(0.1100)
(0.1201)
0.4861*** 0.4489***

12,090
-7,094

(0.0365)
-0.0695***
(0.0137)
11,825
-6,748

atthe0.01level.
***Significant
** Significant
atthe0.05level.
* Significant
atthe0.10level.

coefficient estimates using this dependentvariable. The positive estimated coefficients on the
countrytax ratevariableacrossthe specificationspresentedin columns 1 through3 are consistent
with the tax incentives that affiliates face, since higher foreign tax rates reduce US obligations
upon repatriation.22
Columns2 and 3 of TableVII add a partialownershipdummythat equals one if the American
parentowns less than 100%of an affiliate,and zero otherwise.23The resultsreportedin columns
2 and 3 indicate that partially owned affiliates pay dividends most frequently.The estimated
coefficients imply thatpartiallyowned affiliatespay dividendsin 9% more years than do wholly
owned affiliates.
One of the strong implications of the US tax treatmentof foreign income is that American
multinational corporationsshould not simultaneously remit dividends from low-tax foreign

22Inthese specifications,tax rates are averagedacross all years for which the affiliateis in the sample.As a consequence,
measurementof relativetax incentives is somewhatnoisy.
23Allaffiliates in the sample are majorit -wned, so partialownershipis defined as more than 50% but less than 100%
ownership.
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to PayDividends,
Figure4. Propensity
byChangesin Paid-In-Capital
(PIC),1983-2002
affiliates:
Figure4 tracksthe shareof dividendpayersfor threesubsetsof majority-owned
incorporated
decreasesof PIC>5%;and(iii) all
(i) thoseexperiencingincreasesof PIC>5%;(ii) thoseexperiencing
others.
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%

20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
---

Share of PIC increasers paying dividends --Share of PIC nonchangers paying dividends

Share of PIC decreasers paying dividends

locations and transferequity funds into the same foreign locations. Doing so generatesa homecountrytax liability that could be easily avoided simply by reducingboth dividends and equity
transfers.Nevertheless, the data indicate that American multinationalfirms engage in this taxpenalized behavior.
Figure 4 shows that the likelihood of paying a dividend is the same across the sample period,
regardless of the contemporaneouschange in paid-in-capital.The regressions presented in
columns 4 through6 of TableVII show the determinantsof tax-penalizedbehavior,thus testing
whether this behavior is driven by situations in which parent firms impose rigid repatriation
policies in reactionto partialownershipof affiliates.
Columns4 through6 of TableVII reportthe regressionsrun on the sampleof affiliate-yearsfor
which parentcompaniesincreasedpaid-inaffiliatecapital.The tablereportsestimatedcoefficients
fromProbitspecificationsin which the dependentvariableequalsone if the affiliatepaida nonzero
dividendto its parentand zero otherwise.The largepositive estimatedcoefficientson the country
tax ratevariableindicatethataffiliatesin high tax ratecountriesarethe mostlikely to pay dividends
while receiving equity transfersfrom their parents,which is consistentwith their tax incentives.
Parentfirmswithoutexcess foreigntax creditsthathave affiliateslocatedin countrieswith high tax
rates can find it advantageousto remit dividendswhile simultaneouslytransferringequity funds
from the parent,since doing so generatesforeigntax creditsthat can profitablybe used to reduce
tax burdenson other income. The positive coefficientson the partialownershipdummyvariable
supportthe resultsreportedin columns 2 and 3 indicatingthatparentcompaniesrequirepartially
owned affiliatesto pay regulardividends.The estimatesfrom column 5 imply that the effect of
partialownershipis similarto the effect of a 100%highertax rate.Thedividendbehaviorof partially
owned affiliatesdifferssignificantlyfromthatof affiliatesthatarewholly owned by theirparents.
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IV.Conclusion
The foreign affiliates of American multinational corporations follow well-defined
repatriationpolicies that entail the gradual adjustmentof payouts in the direction of targets
that depend on current earnings and the tax costs of repatriating dividends. Although
repatriationpolicies are responsive to tax factors, the similarity of dividend policies across
entities that have distinctive tax treatmentsindicates that tax motivations alone cannot explain
the patterns of behavior. Repatriations help parent firms meet their financing needs, since
larger dividends to external shareholders are associated with larger dividend repatriations
inside the firm. Furthermore, highly levered parent companies with profitable domestic
investment opportunities draw more heavily on the resources of their foreign affiliates. The
analysis of explicitly tax-penalized behavior and regularized repatriationpolicies suggests
that shared ownership of foreign affiliates contributes substantially to the routinization of
repatriationpolicy inside the firm.
What Black (1976) christenedthe "dividendpuzzle" - the problem of reconciling observed
dividend behavior with economic incentives facing the relevant decision makers- is typically
cast as a resultof the relationshipbetween externalshareholdersand intemrnal
corporatemanagers.
Repatriationpolicy inside the firm is subjectto many,but not all, of the same pressures,as arethe
dividendpolicies of firmswith public ownership.The resultsin this paperindicatethatthe factors
thatgovern repatriationpolicies inside the firm- tax factors,costly externalfinanceat the parent
level, and agency concerns with the firms - are those that scholars emphasize in attemptingto
resolve the dividendpuzzle more generally.n
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